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Abstract 
Modern medical research, particularly genetic research, is changing the nature of 
medicine. Concerns surrounding these changes and their potential negative impact on 
human rights led UNESCO to spearhead collaboration by experts in the creation of 
an international instrument intended to provide guidance for the promotion of 
bioethics and the protection of human rights in the genetic context. The result was the 
Universal Declaration of the Human Genome and Human Rights. This article briefly 
highlights the scientific and social setting into which the Declaration was injected. 
This is followed by a consideration of the drafting body (the IBC) so as to assess 
whether UNESCO was the appropriate body to lead this project. The process by 
which the Declaration was created is also considered so as to assess whether it 
represents an example of ethical and democratic drafting. Finally, the substantive 
content of the Declaration is considered and measured against the pre-existing 
regime so as to assess whether it represents an intelligible and coherent response to 
the concerns raised capable of offering guidance now and into the future. By 
assessing these procedural and substantive matters, one can draw some tentative 
conclusions about the utility and significance of the Declaration.  
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[Human] genetics … is beginning to create a new generation of 
acute and subtle dilemmas that will in the new millennium transform 
the ways in which we think of ourselves and of society.  It is 
genetics, bringing both a new understanding of what we are and 
almost daily developing new ways of enabling us to influence what 
we are, that is creating a revolution in thought, and not least in 
ethics.
1
 
1. Introduction 
The inexorable advance of science is expanding the breadth and scope of human 
activity.  Nowhere is its impact more acute than in the health and related fields, where 
it has contributed to a sea change in individual and community healthcare.  It has 
made healthcare more predictive, increased treatment options, expanded healthcare 
programs and altered the social setting within which medicine is practiced.
2
  It has 
huge potential to alleviate suffering and increase quality of life.  The intimate 
interaction between scientific advances and health led to concerns about the pace of 
advances, the dearth of applicable legal standards, and the social consequences of the 
application of biotechnology within existing healthcare systems. 
Unsurprisingly, genetic advances play an increasingly important role in the scientific 
advances that impact healthcare.  Although genetics has the potential to increase 
healthcare options, it also gives rise to fears.  It offers knowledge about humanity’s 
vital mechanisms and the capability to influence and modify them, which prompts 
fears that attempts to control present health could injure future health.
3
  It offers the 
capability to “design” the humans of the future, which, given past abusive eugenic 
practices,
4
 excited anxiety over sex and genetic discrimination and the development of 
heretofore unheard of liability claims.
5
  It offers the possibility of transforming the 
                                                 
1
  J. Harris, “Introduction: The Scope and Importance of Bioethics” in J. Harris (ed.), Bioethics 
(Oxford: OUP, 2001), at 20. 
2
  D. Morgan, “Science, Medicine and Ethical Change” in A. Bainham et al. (eds.), Body Lore 
and Laws (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 329-342, at 329.  For more on these, see N. Matsaniotis, 
“The Evolution of Technology, Genetics and Bioethics” in L. Sicilianos & M. Gavouneli (eds.), 
Scientific and Technological Developments and Human Rights (Athens: Sakkoulas Publishers, 2001) 
161-170, at 164, V. Harpwood, “Gene Therapy Treatment for Parkinson’s Disease” (2002) 9(11) 
M.L.M. 2-4, V. Harpwood, “Malaria Likely to be Conquered by Geneticists” (2002) 9(11) M.L.M. 5, 
and T. Beauchamp, “On Justifications for Coercive Genetic Control” in J. Humber & R. Almeder 
(eds.), Biomedical Ethics and the Law (London: Plenum Press, 1977) 361-374, at 363. 
3
  We are only at the beginning of understanding.  Research has not yet produced a single 
broadly applicable therapeutic treatment.  Even if gene therapy were possible (it remains a dream), 
interventions could have unforeseen consequences.  For example, upon discovery of the sickle cell 
anaemia gene, its link to resistance to malaria was discovered.  See T. Caulfield, “Underwhelmed: 
Hyperbole, Regulatory Policy and the Genetic Revolution” (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 437-460, at 440-445, 
and E. Marden & D. Nelkin, “Displaced Agendas: Current Regulatory Strategies for Germline Gene 
Therapy” (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 461-481. 
4
  A common example is that of the Nazis, but there are others: M. Kirby, Through the World’s 
Eye (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2000),  at 44-45. 
5
  Examples include the emergence of (1) “informational claims” by individuals for whom 
biotechnology has altered the structure of human kinship, (2) “wrongful life” claims by “defective” 
individuals seeking compensation for their diminished ability to achieve the autonomy, interpersonal 
relationships and personal development as a result of improperly utilized biotechnology, and (3) 
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22 
species, which, given certain healthcare shortfalls (i.e., the organ transplant crisis
6
), 
leads to distress over healthcarers being pushed precipitously toward genetic 
solutions. 
Further, genetic research/knowledge and the distribution of new genetic 
biotechnologies are facilitated by a world in the throes of “globalization”,
7
 which 
contributed to concerns about the Human Genome Project (HGP)
8
 and the worldwide 
implications of its potential negative consequences.  Some concerns were expressed 
as follows: 
[T]he interdependence of developments in the world is felt more 
acutely today than ever before.  The HGP, … which will lead to 
breakthroughs in the most intimate knowledge of the biology of 
                                                                                                                                            
“negligence claims” against genetic counselors.  See N. Lenoir, “The Human Genome: From UNESCO 
to the UN” in L. Sicilianos & M. Gavouneli (eds.), supra, note 2, 171-178, L. Walters, “Reproductive 
Technologies and Genetics” in R. Veatch (ed.), Medical Ethics, 2d ed. (London: Jones & Bartlett, 
1997) 209-233, at 212, and B. Knoppers et al., “Physicians and Genetic Malpractice” (2002) 21 Med. 
Law 661-680. 
6
  R. Vermot-Mangold (Rapporteur), Trafficking in Organs in Europe (2003) Doc. 9822, J. 
Montgomery, Health Care Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2003), and many more. 
7
  Globalization is characterized by increasing (1) cross-border integration of political, 
economical and cultural practices and dissemination of values and information, (2) control of 
infrastructure (ie: transport, utilities, emergency services, banking, security) by computer; and (3) 
transnational mobility of people, disease, products/technology and capital.  See R. Rogers, “Identity 
Revisited in the New Technological Culture” (2000) 19 Med. Law 381-387, at 382, and P. Bates, 
“Health, Law, Ethics and Policy: Challenges and New Avenues for the 21st Century and New 
Millennium” (1999) 18 Med. Law 13-46.  For more on globalization, see D. Henwood, “Beyond 
Globophobia” (2003) at www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/define/2003/1113globophobia.htm (July 
10/04), IMF, “Globalization: Threat or Opportunity?” (2002) at 
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm (July 10/04), C. Norchi, “The Global Divide” (2000) 
at www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/davos/davos10.htm (July 10/04), L. Sklair, “Competing 
Conceptions of Globalization” (1999) 5 J.W.S.R. 143, C. Chase-Dunn, “Globalization: A World-
Systems Perspective” (1999) 5 J.W.S.R. 165, J. Breidenbach & I. Zukrigl, “The Dynamics of Cultural 
Globalization” (1998) at www.inst.at/studies/collab/breidenb.htm (July 10/04), C. Sjolander, “The 
Rhetoric of Globalization: What’s in a Wor(l)d?” (1996) 51 Int’l J. 603, P. Cerny, “Globalization and 
Other Stories: The Search for a New Paradigm for International Relations” (1996) 51 Int’l J. 617, W. 
Reisman, “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law” (1990) 84 A.J.I.L. 866. 
Both www.emory.edu/soc/globalization.issues01.html and 
www.globalization.about.com/cs/whatsit/a/whatsit.htm (July 10/04), provide further links to a host of 
sources. 
8
  The Human Genome Project (HGP) is a global collaborative scientific endeavour with the 
goal of mapping and sequencing the entire chain of human DNA and genes.  Begun in the 1980s, it 
involves Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK, the US, regional 
organizations such as the EU, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the WHO. The 
Human Genome Organization (HUGO), an independent organization of international scientists, 
coordinates the research and fosters collaboration among scientists so as to avoid competition and 
duplication.  The genome is now 99% mapped and researchers are moving into the functional analysis 
and genetic variation phases.  It has been described positively as “one of the most ambitious scientific 
projects ever undertaken”, and negatively as a process “driven by an opportunistic technology, an 
avaricious lobby and misguided goals”.  See A. Taylor, “Globalization and Biotechnology: UNESCO 
and an International Strategy to Advance Human Rights and Public Health” (1999) 25 A.J.L.M. 479-
541, E. Ben-Asher et al., “Harvesting the Human Genome: The Israeli Perspective” (2000) 2 I.M.A.J. 
657-664, S. MacLean & D. Giesen, “Legal and Ethical Considerations of the Human Genome Project” 
(1994) 1 M.L.I. 159, and A. Lippman, “Led (Astray) by Genetic Maps: The Cartography of the Human 
Genome and Health Care” (1992) 25 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1496, for further background on the HGP. 
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23 
human beings, requires true international cooperation and an 
unrestricted exchange of information, firstly because of the returns 
this can have with relation to research and application and, 
secondly, because of the need for international analysis of the 
societal, ethical and … legal implications this project could 
engender.
9
 
And: 
Scientific and technological progress [permits] increasing control 
of our environment and … our living conditions.  In the fields of 
biology and genetics especially, progress is all the more staggering 
since man, for the first time, has the power to transform living 
matter in a programmed and selective manner. … It is above all in 
the biomedical field that progress has been the most spectacular 
and provokes the most questions, especially since it involves living 
human beings.
10
 
 
The “age of genetics”
11
 was viewed as a “risk society”
12
 with the potential for 
catastrophic harm.
13
  It demanded “lengthened foresight” to “help disclose what is 
possibly at stake, what values and traditions we may pass up, what goals and 
opportunities we ought, in all conscience, to deny ourselves; what we must avoid … 
[and] preserve at all cost.”
14
 
This led Federico Mayor, Director-General of the United Nations Economic, Social 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
15
 to conclude that UNESCO needed to 
                                                 
9
  F. Mayor, “Statement at ‘Genetics, Ethics and Human Values: Human Genome Mapping, 
Genetic Screening and Gene Therapy’” 24th CIOMS Conference, Japan, 1990.  An international 
response was also warranted because of the international awareness that globalization linkages was 
creating about scientific possibilities and issues.  For more on these linkages and the evolving “global” 
awareness, see UN Secretary-General, Report: An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., UN Doc. A/47/277-S/34111 (1992). 
10
  N. Lenoir, “Annual Report of the IBC” in Proceedings of the Second Session of the IBC, vol. I 
(Paris: UNESCO, 1995), 1-9, at 1. 
11
  R. Brownsword et al., “Human Genetics and the Law: Regulating a Revolution” in R. 
Brownsword et al. (eds.), Law and Human Genetics: Regulating a Revolution (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 1-
5, at 5. 
12
  Wherein we look not at what nature can do but at what we can do, thereby circumventing 
“fate”: see D. Morgan, supra, note 2, at 331-332, and U. Beck, Risk Society: Toward A New Modernity 
(London: Sage, 1992), who coined the phrase “risk society”. 
13
  Indeed, most initial responses to genetic breakthroughs were reactionary, emotive, precipitous 
and negative.  For more on this, see M. Lupton, “To Clone or Not to Clone – Whither the Law?” 
(1999) 18 Med. Law 107-123. 
14
  D. Morgan, supra, note 2, at 341, quoting Hans Jonas, a German philosopher.  See also S. 
Murphy, “Biotechnology and International Law” (2001) 42 Harv. I.L.J. 47-139, and S. Benatar, “A 
Perspective from Africa on Human Rights and Genetic Engineering” in J. Burley (ed.), The Genetic 
Revolution and Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 159-189, for a discussion of the science and its 
applications and the human rights concerns surrounding its use. 
15
  UNESCO is a specialized agency formed pursuant to art. 57 of the United Nations Charter. 
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contribute “more fully to the construction of a common human destiny grounded on 
the essential values of mankind.”
16
  He understood that, like developments on the 
scientific side, effective legal and ethical responses would have to be coordinated 
globally.  An international initiative reliant on universal standards derived largely 
from the International Bill of Rights (IBR), which includes the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR),
17
 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),
18
 and the International Covenant on Economical, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),
19
 could be coordinated through UNESCO.
20
  Thus, in 1993, UNESCO’s 
newly created International Bioethics Committee (IBC) began drafting an 
international bioethics instrument specifically directed at human rights and genetics.
21
  
                                                 
16
  F. Mayor, “Preface” in Proceedings of the First Session of the IBC (Paris: UNESCO, 1994). 
17
  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th Plen. 
Mtg., UN Doc. A/811 (1948). 
18
  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200, UN GAOR, 21st Sess., 
Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 171, and its Optional Protocol, GA Res. 2200, 
UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
19
  International Covenant on Economical, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200, UN 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
20
  Authored by a broad cross-section of ideologically opposed states in the aftermath of WWII, 
and enjoying a high level of consensus in a variety of cultures, the IBR (or parts of it) is widely 
accepted as representative of universal standards.  Its “universal” status is bolstered by the inclusion of 
its key principles in numerous international and regional instruments.  For example, see the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1950), the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981), the Arab Charter on Human Rights (1994), and many 
other Conventions and Declarations.  Even the largely odious Bangkok Declaration (1993) evokes a 
common understanding of equality and non-discrimination.  Otherwise it has been roundly and 
correctly criticized as a cynical and politically-motivated relativistic instrument intended to empower 
specific Asian regimes against opposition, both domestically and internationally: see H. Samuels, 
“Hong Kong on Women, Asian Values and the Law” (1999) 21 H.R. Quart. 707-734, and E. Lee, 
“Human Rights and Non-Western Values” in M. Davis (ed.), Human Rights and Chinese Values 
(Oxford: OUP, 1995) 72-90, at 87-88. 
For more on the IBR, its history and universality, see A. Taylor, supra, note 8, at 502-505, K. 
Appiah, “Citizens of the World” in M. Gibney (ed.), Globalizing Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2003) 189-232, 
M. Glendon, “The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the Universal Human Rights 
Idea” (2003) 16 Harv. H.R.J. 27-40, at 27 and 31, R. Andorno, “Biomedicine and International Human 
Rights Law: In Search of a Global Consensus” (2002) 80(12) WHO Bulletin 959-963, R. Macklin, 
Against Relativism: Cultural Diversity and the Search for Ethical Universals in Medicine (Oxford: 
OUP, 1999), J. Mann et al., “Human Rights and Public Health” in J. Mann et al. (eds.), Health and 
Human Rights (London: Routledge, 1999) 7-20, S. Goonesekere, “Nationality and Women’s Human 
Rights: The Asia/Pacific Experience” in A. Byrnes et al. (eds.), Advancing the Human Rights of 
Women: Using International Human Rights Standards in Domestic Litigation (London: 
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1996) 86-100, at 87-88, A. Cassese, Human Rights in a Changing World 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), T. Buergenthal, International Human Rights in a Nutshell 
(Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1988), at 17-18. 
21
  This overt linking was a predictable step in the evolution of both disciplines.  Human rights, 
from the UDHR to the present, has been motivated by the desire to safeguard “human dignity” 
generally.  Bioethics (often framed by autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice), although 
directed at enhancing the availability and quality of healthcare, often both draws and impacts on 
“human dignity”.  For more on “human dignity”, see paras. 1 and 5 of the Preamble and art. 1 of the 
UDHR, R. Andorno, ibid, at 960, O. Schachter, “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept” in H. 
Steiner & P. Alston (eds.), International Human Rights in Context, 2d ed. (London: Cambridge U. 
Press, 2000), 400-402, at 400-401, R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 
1977), and others. 
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The offspring of UNESCO’s efforts, the Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights (the Declaration), was adopted by the General 
Conference in 1997,
22
 and by the UN General Assembly in 1998.
23
 
The following article assesses both the process of the Declaration’s creation and the 
substance of its provisions, with a view to assessing its significance and determining 
whether the rationale for drafting it (as identified above) has been realized.  Part 1 
undertakes a “process examination”.  First, it considers the Declaration’s authors 
(UNESCO/IBC) to determine whether they were entitled and best situated to act.  
Second, it highlights the drafting process to determine whether what was adopted was 
ethical or democratic and thereby in keeping with the spirit of the instrument itself.  
Part 2 undertakes a “substance examination”. First, it reviews some of the pre-existing 
international human rights instruments that influenced the Declaration’s creation to 
determine whether a new instrument was warranted.  Second, it considers the content 
of the Declaration to determine whether it advances coherent foundational values 
supported by effective substantive rights and, in addition, fills any gaps left by the 
pre-existing regime.  Having considered these issues, one may be able to draw some 
conclusions about the significance of the Declaration and its proper place in the 
international genetic and human rights regulatory pantheon. 
2. Process Examination: The Authors & The Drafting Process 
2.1 Authorship:  The role/remit of UNESCO and the IBC.  Is their leadership in 
the genetics and human rights field appropriate? 
Pursuant to its Constitution,
24
 UNESCO is comprised of a General Conference,
25
 an 
Executive Board,
26
 and a Secretariat.
27
  It is further divided into five specialized 
                                                 
22
  UNESCO General Conference Resolution 29 C/17, UNESCO GC, 29th Sess. (1997). 
23
  UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/152, UN GAOR, 53rd Sess. (1998). 
24
  Adopted in London on November 16, 1945, when representatives from 37 states signed it, it 
came into force on November 4, 1946, when 20 signatories ratified it.  The Constitution can be viewed 
at www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=Constitution (May 5/04). 
25
  The General Conference is the primary decision-making body of UNESCO (see art. IV).  It is 
comprised of representatives of member states (each of which have one vote) and associate member 
states together with observers from non-member states, NGOs and intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs).  The General Conference meets every 2 years to elect Executive Board members, determine 
policy directions and assess programs, and make budgetary decisions.  UNESCO derives its budget 
from member state assessments and extra-budgetary funding from NGOs, IGOs and other private 
sector sources.  For more on the General Conference and budget/funding information, see 
www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=The Organization (May 10/04). 
26
  The Executive Board is composed of representatives from 58 member states.  Representatives 
are elected to reflect the cultural and geographic diversity of UNESCO.  It meets twice per year to 
ensure that the decisions made by the General Conference are implemented and to prepare the work of 
the General Conference.  Its tasks are defined by the Constitution (see art. V), the General Conference 
and agreements with the UN, various specialized UN agencies and other IGOs, and includes advising 
the UN.  For more on this body, see www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=The Organization 
(May 10/04). 
27
  The Secretariat, structured and governed by art. VI of the Constitution, consists of the 
Director-General and his or her staff.  The Director-General is the executive head of UNESCO.  His or 
her role is to formulate policies, proposals of action and budgetary recommendations for the General 
Conference.  The staff, some 2,000 people from 160 states as of April 2003, implement existing and 
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Sectors, one of which is the Human & Social Sciences Sector.
28
  The IBC, established 
within this Sector, was an ad hoc body comprised of 50 independent experts in 
anthropology, biology, genetics, law, medicine and philosophy, chosen by the 
Director-General to reflect the geographical and cultural diversity of UNESCO.  It 
was approved by the General Conference
29
 and eventually made permanent.
30
  The 
IBC’s general purposes are to: 
1) Raise issues and promote reflection and the exchange of ideas regarding 
developments in the life sciences; 
2) Make recommendations and encourage action among decision-makers (i.e., 
states, IGOs, NGOs and domestic bioethics committees); and 
3) Disseminate the principles set out in the UDHR and apply them to new 
technologies.
31
 
Its specific remit was to conduct a debate on the ethical, social, and human 
consequences of genetic developments and prepare an international instrument for the 
protection of the human genome.
32
 
The Director-General opined that UNESCO must “play its full role in the world of the 
future [by conducting] a world-wide debate on the ethical, social and human 
consequences of the development of the life sciences.”
33
  Insofar as the IBC’s drafting 
process created a global and cross-cultural debate on genetics, bioethics and human 
rights, it fulfilled this goal and was in conformity with UNESCO’s Constitutional 
purposes, which are, inter alia, to: 
1) Develop and increase the means of communication between peoples and 
employ them to promote mutual understanding and a truer/better knowledge of 
each other’s lives;
34
 
2) Advance, through educational, scientific and cultural relations, the objectives 
of international peace and common welfare of mankind;
35
 and 
                                                                                                                                            
newly developed programs and maintain 53 field offices around the world.  For more on this body, see 
www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=The Organization (May 5/04). 
28
  The HSS Sector is tasked with helping people understand and interpret the developing social, 
cultural and economic environment.  It does this by: (1) studying what is (providing imperical 
research); (2) anticipating what could be (providing philosophical critiques); and (3) determining what 
should be (providing ethics and human rights-based analyses).  Generally, it analyzes societal trends 
and tries to steer them in directions supportive of the UDHR and its own institutional goals of 
promoting education, discourse and peace.  See www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=Social 
Sciences (May 20/04). 
29
  UNESCO General Conference Resolution 27 C/5.15, UNESCO GC, 27th Sess. (1993). 
30
  UNESCO Executive Board Resolution, UNESCO EB, 154th Sess. (1998). 
31
  See www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=Social Sciences/Ethics/Bioethics/IBC (May 
21/04). 
32
  Justice M. Kirby suggests that the impending completion of the HGP made the choice of 
acting on genetics self-evident: M. Kirby, “Inquiry re: Declaration” from jsaleh@hcourt.gov.au (May 
20/04).  
33
  H. Espiell, Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 
(Paris: UNESCO, 1999), at 1. 
34
  Preamble, para. 6. 
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3) Contribute to peace and security by promoting educational, scientific and 
cultural collaboration among states in order to further universal respect for 
justice, rule of law and human rights affirmed for all peoples without 
discrimination.
36
 
These purposes are to be realized through constitutionally-sanctioned activities, 
including cooperation with other specialized agencies whose interests and activities 
are related to its own purposes,
37
 and encouragement of cooperation and personnel 
exchanges among states in all branches of intellectual activity.
38
  UNESCO is also 
empowered to collaborate in the preparation of international agreements to promote 
the free flow of ideas by word and image.
39
  Indeed UNESCO collaboration in the 
preparation of international instruments is neither new nor novel: 
UNESCO, the premier international organization in the fields of 
science, culture, communications and education, has the legal 
authority to negotiate and sponsor the codification and 
implementation of international instruments advancing technology, 
public health and human rights.
40
 
Its initiative is also defended as being: 
… perfectly in line with the objectives of this international 
organization … [which is] “to contribute to peace and security by 
promoting collaboration among the nations through education, 
science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, 
for the rule of law and for human rights …” because it is clear that 
the increasing access to the human genome has profound 
implications for human rights … .
41
 
Although UNESCO’s Constitution confers authority to develop “conventions” and 
“recommendations”,
42
 not “declarations”, it is generally accepted that 
                                                                                                                                            
35
  Preamble, para. 7. 
36
  Article I(1). 
37
  Article XI. 
38
  Article I(2)(c). 
39
  Article I(2)(a). 
40
  A. Taylor, supra, note 8, at 481.  In fact, UNESCO has served as the forum for the preparation 
of some 33 international conventions and a host of other instruments, including the Convention Against 
Discrimination in Education (1960), the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural 
Cooperation (1966), the Recommendation Concerning the Status of Scientific Researchers (1974), the 
Convention Concerning the Protection of Natural and Cultural World Heritage (1972), and the 
Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice (1978).  See F. Mayor, Report of the Director-General, 
UNESCO, 29th Sess., Annex D, UNESCO Doc. 29C/3 (1997). 
41
  R. Andorno, “Seeking Common Ground on Genetic Issues: The UNESCO Declaration on the 
Human Genome” in J. Sandor (ed.), Society and Genetic Information: Codes and Laws in the Genetic 
Era (Budapest: Central European University, 2003), 105-123, at 105. [hereinafter paginated 1-12]  
42
  See art. IV(4). 
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recommendations and declarations, both of which are non-binding (or “soft law”), are 
substantively similar and the use of the latter does not invalidate the initiative.
43
 
Although UNESCO was still rehabilitating its tarnished reputation,
44
 its IBC was the 
only global forum for in-depth bioethical reflection.
45
  Few other international 
organizations could claim the same level of experience and knowledge regarding 
science, its cross-cultural impact, and its significance for human rights.
46
  Further, 
none of UNESCO’s competitors or compatriots in the human rights field represent 
any measurable improvement in representation or structure, nor do the instruments 
they have drafted represent any significant improvement in form or content.
47
  Finally, 
it is not inappropriate for non-state entities like UNESCO to take the lead on 
emerging issues.  This is an unavoidable symptom of the new global era where 
sovereignty has been re-conceptualized and such institutions (i.e., IMF, WIPO, WTO) 
take on international law-making functions.
48
 
Given the above, UNESCO’s IBC was probably the body best suited to prepare the 
first international instrument on genetics.  At the very least, it was within its broad 
remit to do so. 
2.2 Process:  The mechanics of drafting the Declaration and the deviations.  
Was the process ethical and democratic? 
It was recognized at the outset that the IBC’s task would be delicate because of the 
diversity of ethical positions founded on divergent value systems conditioned by 
disparate cultural and religious traditions and societal and economic standings.
49
  The 
highlights of the drafting process, which was conducted by a multi-national group of 
experts conscious of the cultural, legal, philosophical, and religious milieu, are: 
                                                 
43
  See A. Taylor, supra, note 8, at 508, and the sources cited in his note 247.  For more on the 
considerations which went into the choice of drafting a declaration as opposed to some other form of 
instrument, see H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 27-31. 
44
  A. Taylor, ibid, at 525-526.  UNESCO’s turbulent history and controversial activities, which 
led to US (1985) and UK (1986) withdrawal, is well documented: see M. Allen, “UNESCO and the 
ILO: A Tale of Two Agencies” (1985) 1 J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol. 391, and M. Finnemore, “International 
Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The UN Educational, Scientific  and Cultural Organization and 
Science Policy” (1993) 47 Int’l Org. 565. 
45
  See H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 1, and www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=Social 
Sciences/Ethics/Bioethics/IBC (May 21/04). 
46
  A. Iles, “The Human Genome Project: A Challenge to the Human Rights Framework” (1996) 
9 Harv. H.R.J. 27-60, at 43. 
47
  The UN Commission on Human Rights represents an alternative drafting institution, but has 
remained largely inactive, appearing to adopt the view that the existing human rights framework is 
adequate.  In any event, an examination discloses no obvious advantage (procedurally or otherwise) 
with respect to preparing an international instrument on genetics.  The Council of Europe has drafted 
the more broadly applicable Biomedicine Convention (1998), but the Council of Europe is a regional 
body, its Convention reflects the Declaration in several respects, and it has not mandated significant 
departures from the existing member practices.  See A. Iles, ibid, at 39-42. 
48
  R. McCorquodale & R. Fairbrother, “Globalization and Human Rights” (1999) 21 H.R. Quart. 
735-766, at 736-737. 
49
  N. Lenoir, “Report to the Director General on the Human Genome” in Proceedings of the 
First Session of the IBC (Paris: UNESCO, 1994) 3-20, at 16. 
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• Drafting took 4 years.  The IBC’s Legal Commission conducted 8 meetings 
and the IBC held 4 sessions.  These bodies debated some 9 drafts.
50
  Although 
there was a body of key contributors, every member of the IBC took part in 
the drafting of one article or another, and most member states contributed.
51
  
The Declaration was finalized by a committee of government representatives 
from 81 member states.
52
 
• The IBC used broad consultative procedures; it solicited learned papers and 
considered opinions from various domestic and international bodies, and 
circulated at least one draft and questionnaire to some 300 bodies—scientific, 
philosophical, legal, ethical, intergovernmental, and UN—for comments and 
suggestions.
53
 
• Drafting was accompanied by a host of related activities, such as support of 
fledgling bioethics training programs, conduct of issue-specific genetic-related 
surveys, and sponsorship of various bioethics-related domestic statutes.
54
  
These fostered dialogue amongst public decision-makers, experts and others 
and thereby broadened mutual understanding and enhanced (bioethical) 
education with a view to promoting justice, human welfare, and human rights 
principles.
55
 
It is claimed that the overall institutional framework emphasized the ethical elements 
of scientific development, and that the drafting procedure modeled an “ethical” 
drafting process based on the articulation of “consensus-based” principles and rights, 
and was free of political influence and vested interest pressures.
56
  Although this is 
largely true, politics played some part, most noticeably in the late addition of specific 
prohibitions in arts. 11 and 24.  Regarding the art. 11 cloning prohibition, it has been 
said: 
We know that the statement defining cloning as ‘contrary to human 
dignity’ was a late addition by UNESCO to the text originally 
produced by [the IBC].  Moreover, one of the [IBC] members … has 
                                                 
50
  H. Espiell, supra, note 33. 
51
  See H. Espiell, ibid.  F. Mayor (Spain), H. Espiell (Uruguay) and N. Lenoir (France) dominate 
the documentary background: see www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=Social 
Sciences/Ethics/Bioethics/IBC Documents (May4/04).  Special contributions from B. Knoppers 
(Canada), S. Altman (USA), and Gonzalo Yanez (Chile) are noted within the documents: see H. 
Espiell, ibid, at 53.  N. Lenoir, B. Knoppers and M. Jean (Canada) are also singled out by subsequent 
IBC members: see M. Kirby, supra, note 32, Q-5. 
52
  A. Taylor, supra, note 8, at 509. 
53
  And the response resulted in a “wealth and diversity of contributions” which were discussed at 
the Fifth Meeting of the Legal Commission, September 25, 1995: see H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 67-
78, and Annex VII. 
54
  F. Mayor, “Address by the Director General” in Proceedings of the First Session of the IBC 
(Paris: UNESCO, 1994) 63-67, at 63, and N. Lenoir, “Speech” in Proceedings of the Third Session of 
the IBC, vol. I (Paris: UNESCO, 1995), 111-114, at 113. 
55
  H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 2. 
56
  N. Lenoir, supra, note 5, at 172, N. Lenoir, supra, note 49, at 16, and N. Lenoir, supra, note 
54, at 113, wherein she described the process as “ethical” in that it was “transparent and interactive”. 
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reported that ‘several delegations proposed not to rush in 
condemning any particular technique, including cloning’.
57
 
and: 
It is my belief that the inclusion of specific reference … [to] banning 
reproductive cloning was added after the IBC itself had finished its 
work and as a consequence of initiatives of … Professor Mayor.
58
 
Similarly, a prohibition of germ-line interventions was originally considered 
inappropriate,
59
 but nevertheless found its way into art. 24, lending support to the 
allegation that the Declaration is a “dignitarian instrument” created by a “dignitarian 
alliance”: 
… ‘[D]ignitarian’ because its fundamental commitment is to the 
principle that human dignity should not be compromised; … 
‘[A]lliance’ because there is more than one pathway to this ethic – 
Kantian and communitarian as well as religious … [and each are 
represented in the supporters to the Declaration].  … [T]he 
dignitarian view gives voice to the interests of conservatism, 
constancy and stability … [and] the concern that we should … hang 
on to those parts of the human condition that are familiar and 
reassuringly ‘human’ [and it is exemplified by the reproductive 
cloning and germ-line intervention prohibitions].
60
 
Analysis of the drafting process permits only ambivalent conclusions.  Certainly it 
was ethical in that it solicited the learned opinions of a swathe of experts, and the text 
was subject to extensive debate and numerous drafts.  In short, and as suggested 
above, it was inclusive of culture- and rights-sensitive men and women from across 
the globe who attempted to articulate an instrument capable of addressing both 
science and rights.  All told, a compelling argument could be made in support of the 
“commendable and largely ethical” process.  However, the process suffered from at 
least a couple incidents of political wrangling and compromise.  One might 
legitimately argue that compromise and negotiation/wrangling support the democratic 
aspect of the Declaration’s creation, and obviously trade-offs are a common feature in 
the democratic process.  However, the trade-offs identified above appear to have been 
associated with tactics of questionable procedural merit in that they may have been 
achieved “out-of-process”.  The resultant provisions are the most controversial and 
                                                 
57
  J. Harris, supra, note 1, at 64, who quotes M. Revel as disclosing the discord or lack of 
unanimity on this point. 
58
  M. Kirby, supra, note 32, Q-6.  For more on the politics that shaped the final version of the 
Declaration, see M. Revel, “Human Reproductive Cloning, Embryo Stem Cells and Germline Gene 
Intervention: An Israeli Perspective” (2003) 22 Med. Law 701-732. 
59
  H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 58, citing the comments at the 5th Meeting of the Legal 
Commission.  In 1990, CIOMS concluded that the possibility of germ-line interventions should remain 
open: A. Taylor, supra, note 8, at 496. 
60
  R. Brownsword et al., supra, note 11, at 4-5.  See also D. Dwyer, “Beyond Autonomy: The 
Role of Dignity in Biolaw” (2003) 23 Ox. J.L.S. 319. 
(2005) 2:1 SCRIPT-ed 
 
31 
generally viewed as the least justified.
61
  Nonetheless, one cannot conclude that they 
detract from the propriety of UNESCO actions. 
2.3 Summation 
The Declaration was a response to the dramatic and alarming rate of scientific 
advances, particularly genetic ones.  Its conception was marked by several themes: 
fear that science would irreversibly damage a fundamental aspect of humanity; hope 
that a just society is within human capabilities; and concern that we are far from that 
society and sliding in the wrong direction.  Despite the negative triggers, it was a 
response by a body (UNESCO) entitled and reasonably well placed to act and to offer 
leadership in this field.  UNESCO’s decision to act signifies its view that international 
human rights standards can be transmogrified into subject-specific ethical rules that 
can guide biomedical practices regardless of geographic location or cultural 
prevalence, and its desire to push society in a “safe” direction with a specific and 
comprehensive instrument.  Care was taken to ensure that the IBC was a 
representative international body reflective of UNESCO/global membership.  
Principles may have given way to the tactics of a specific philosophical/legal 
perspective,
62
 with consequences that may arguably detract from the legitimacy of the 
drafting process and the acceptability of the Declaration, but the process was largely a 
model of how to ethically draft in an international forum. 
3. Substance Examination: The Predecessor And The Provisions 
Human dignity and the conviction that it should not be compromised play a dominant 
role in both the Declaration and the pre-existing international human rights regime 
(i.e., the IBR).
63
  Although one might assess their value on how they advance this 
principle, “human dignity” on its own is not a useful analytical tool.
64
  It is too vague 
and flexible,
65
 capable of being defined both as: 
• The idea that humans, regardless of status or capacity and by virtue of being 
“human”, have intrinsic or inherent value and worth and are deserving of 
respect;
66
 and 
                                                 
61
  See the discussions in Revel, supra, note 58, and J. Harris, “Clones, Genes and Human 
Rights” in J. Burley (ed.), supra, note 14, 61-94. 
62
  Or to the natural rigours and pitfalls of the democratic process, depending on one’s view. 
63
  N. Lenoir, supra, note 10, at 16-17.  “Dignity” is mentioned some 15 times: see Preamble and 
arts. 1, 2, 6, 10, 11, 12, 15, 21 and 24. 
64
  S. Cowen, “Can Dignity Guide South Africa’s Equality Jurisprudence?” (2001) 17 S.A.J.H.R. 
34-58, at 37-40, states that dignity lacks clear meaning and must be supplemented by other values to 
usefully serve as a conceptual tool. 
65
  R. Macklin, supra, note 20, at 220-221.  M. Bedjaoui, Proceedings of the Third Session of the 
IBC, vol. 1 (Paris: UNESCO, 1995), at 144, stated that “human dignity” is “full of fragility”.   
66
  See D. Beyleveld & R. Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford: 
Oxford U. Press, 2001), at 15-17, and P. Walsh, “Principles and Pragmatism” (1995) 3 M.L.R. 237-
250. 
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• The particular cultural understanding of the inner moral worth of the human 
“person” (which can include family, friends, foes, ancestors and successors) 
and his or her proper political relation with society.
67
 
It is used both as an empowering force (grounding individual rights and freedom of 
choice) and as a constraining force (forbidding “instrumentalization” of the body).
68
 
As such, both the pre-existing regime and the Declaration are more appropriately 
evaluated by assessing the extent to which they coherently define and further other 
dignity-related values, being, in no particular order, (1) autonomy, (2) equality, and 
(3) solidarity.  Autonomy rests on the broad notion of valuing people as physical, 
psychological, economical and legal entities.
69
  It affirms the human capacity for self-
determination that entitles individuals to some level of self-rule, and it therefore 
grounds rights such as confidentiality and freedom from coercion.
70
  Equality also 
rests on the worth/value of humans.  It promotes justice by stipulating that all humans 
are equal before the law and deserving of equitable treatment by, and fair distribution 
of, the benefits of law.  It grounds the right not to be discriminated against.
71  
Solidarity, comprising elements of beneficence and non-maleficence, is the natural 
unity of humanity: the common cause with fellow man.  It imposes on everyone 
duties of mercy, altruism, and charitableness and the duty to avoid doing harm.
72
 
These three values are arguably more definable and measurable than “human dignity” 
standing alone.  Also and importantly, they capture multiple conceptions of “human 
dignity”, which, I believe, increases their validity.  Although they may not be 
completely free of the vagaries that limit the utility of “human dignity” as a measuring 
stick (i.e., a certain interpretive flexibility), they are more easily dealt with and 
therefore preferable. 
3.1 Predecessor to the Declaration: The values and rights of the pre-existing 
regime.  Was it adequate to address the “new genetics”? 
The international human rights regime was and continues to be dominated by the IBR.  
Although not specifically directed at the potential negative consequences of genetic 
advances, the IBR may be relevant in that it promotes autonomy, equality and 
solidarity and their related rights, and it can be applied in a variety of contexts, 
                                                 
67
  See K. Pannikar, “Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?” 383-389, at 387, and 
R. Howard, “Dignity, Community and Human Rights” 398-400, at 399, both in H. Steiner & P. Alston 
(eds.), supra, note 21. 
68
  D. Beyleveld & R. Brownsword, “Human Dignity, Rights and Genetics” in R. Brownsword et 
al. (eds.), supra, note 11, 69-88, at 88.  R. Brownsword, “Regulating Human Genetics: New Dilemmas 
for a New Millenium” (2004) 12 M.L.R. 14, online at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/professional, 
[hereinafter paginated 1-19], at 4, describes the forces that oversaw the creation of the Declaration as a 
“dignitarian alliance” who uses “human dignity” as a constraining force. 
69
  See S. Aksoy & A. Elmali, “The Core Concepts Of The ‘Four Principles’ Of Bioethics As 
Found In Islamic Tradition” (2002) 21 Med. Law 211-224, G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of 
Autonomy (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), at 6. T. Beauchamp & R. Faden, The History and 
Theory of Informed Consent (Oxford: OUP, 1986), at 7. 
70
  O. O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 23. 
71
  T. Beauchamp & J. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1994), 
at 52. 
72
  For more on these concepts, see S. Aksoy & A. Elmali, supra, note 69, at 53. 
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including the genetic context.  Further, the IBR is supported and reaffirmed by 
subsequent instruments directed specifically at the interaction of science and human 
rights. 
With reference to the touchstones identified above, the significance of this regime for 
genetics is as follows: 
• Autonomy-related provisions erect rights (1) of access to healthcare advances, 
(2) of non-coercion of patients/subjects, and (3) to pursue research.  Article 25 
(UDHR) and art. 12 (ICESCR) confirm an individual right to healthcare.  
Article 27 (UDHR) states that everyone has the right to participate in cultural 
life and share in scientific advancement, thus supporting the right to undertake 
research.  Article 7 (ICCPR) erects the necessity of participant consent.  All of 
these rights are logically applicable to and exercisable in the genetic context, 
such as the right of access to genetic healthcare, the right to genetic research, 
and the requirement of consent to genetic treatment and research.  The Tehran 
Declaration,
73
 noting that scientific developments may endanger individual or 
group rights and human dignity, recommends that states study problems 
regarding the “protection of the human personality and its physical and 
intellectual integrity in view of the progress in biology, medicine and 
biochemistry.” 
• Equality-related provisions erect rights of non-discrimination.  Article 7 
(UDHR) states that all are equal before the law and are entitled to equal 
protection of the law.  This could be invoked to bar discrimination based on 
genetic disability or predisposition.  Article 23 (UDHR) affirms the family as 
entitled to protection and could be used to prevent states from limiting choices 
about marriages or reproduction based on genetics.  Articles 22 and 23 
(UDHR) enshrine the rights of employment, choice of employment, 
favourable work conditions, and realization of the economic, social and 
cultural rights essential to human dignity.  They are supportive of a 
requirement that states prevent alterations to social relations and practices that 
reduce the access of some groups to employment, healthcare, and insurance.
74
 
• Solidarity provisions erect rights to share in genetic advances and duties to 
share these advances.  Article 27 (UDHR) and art. 15 (ICESCR) state that 
everyone has the right to “share in” or “enjoy” the benefits of scientific 
advancement and resultant applications.  Individuals or groups could use these 
to demand access to new treatments and to share in advances currently 
enjoyed unevenly.  Article 12 (ICESCR) directs states to take steps for the 
prevention of occupational, endemic, and epidemic diseases.  The UN General 
Assembly has called for states to take measures to ensure that the results of 
science and technology are used only for the benefit of humankind.
75
  
Although not directed at humans per se, the Convention on Biological 
                                                 
73
  Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, UN Doc. A/CONF.32/41 
(1968). 
74
  A. Iles, supra, note 46, at 36. 
75
  General Assembly Resolution 48/140, UN GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, UN Doc. 
A/48/49 (vol. 1) (1994). 
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Diversity
76
 addresses the need to protect, inter alia, biological diversity, which 
includes genetic diversity.
77
  It espouses sharing technology so as to exploit 
and preserve biological and genetic resources,
78
 and it envisions sharing 
knowledge, research, and biotechnology with developing states.
79
 
In addition, and on a more general note, the Scientific and Technological Progress 
Declaration
80
 emphasizes the need to neutralize present and possible future harmful 
consequences of scientific developments, including their interference with individual 
and group human rights. 
All told, the IBR and subsequent instruments create a matrix of values and rights 
evocable in the genetics context.  They could be used by states, which must take 
statutory steps to secure their domestic realization, as touchstones for formulating 
ethical, human-rights-sensitive genetic policy.
81
  Individuals or groups could also use 
them as support for human rights claims: the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR has 
enforcement provisions that can be invoked by individuals.
82
  With respect to 
monitoring, the UN Commission on Human Rights has already invited states and 
NGOs to inform it of measures taken to ensure that science develops in a manner 
respectful of human rights.
83
 
In short, although the IBR and related pre-existing instruments were not created with 
genetics in mind, they form a useful complex latticework of instruments.  However, 
that latticework has gaps in its protection.  For example, the pre-existing regime does 
not make explicitly clear that the genome needs protection.  Further, it fails to 
address, much less answer, some of the dominant health and human rights related 
concerns and questions raised by the new genetics.  For example:
84
 
1) What criteria should be used for identifying permissible genetic research? 
2) What type of consent is most appropriate in the genetic context? 
3) How can we promote and realize the even distribution of benefits? 
                                                 
76
  (1992) 31 I.L.M. 818, signed by 157 states. 
77
  See the Preamble. 
78
  See arts 1, 2 and 7. 
79
  See arts. 12, 15, 16, 17 and 18. 
80
  Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and 
for the Benefit of Mankind, GA Res. 3384, UN GAOR, 30th Sess., UN Doc. A/Res./3384 (1975). 
81
  Such an approach is discussed in B. Knoppers, “Reflections: The Challenge of Biotechnology 
and Public Policy” (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 559-566. 
82
  See arts. 1 to 6. 
83
  CHR Resolution 91, UN GAOR, CHR,  49th Sess., 67th mtg., UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/122 
(1993).  See also Resolution 71 (1997) (non-discrimination in the field of health) and Resolution 11 
(1989) (human rights and bioethics). 
84
  The field of genetics and human rights obviously raises many, many more questions than 
these.  For example, see J. Legemaate, “Integrating Health Law and Health Policy: A European 
Perspective” (2002) 60 Health Policy 101-110, M. Latham & S. Leonard, “The European Convention 
on Biomedicine and the Human Rights Act 1998: Grasping the Nettle of Biomedicine?” in J. Tingle et 
al. (eds.), Healthcare Law: The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 (London: Cavendish, 2001) 331-
346, and more.  However, these are the more obvious and regularly debated questions that the IBR 
leaves unanswered, and therefore grounds support for the creation of additional regulation.  
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4) Is the patenting of human genetic material appropriate and under what 
conditions? 
5) How can we combat the rise of science-based determinism and 
discrimination? 
6) What are the proper protection and disclosure mechanisms for genetic 
information? 
Although this does not represent a comprehensive list of genetically related concerns, 
it represents some of the main questions left unanswered, and lends support to Prof. 
Mayor’s view that something specific, modern, and proactive was necessary: a need 
existed and the Declaration was designed to respond to that need.
85
 
3.2. Content of the Declaration: The values and rights in the Declaration.  Is it a 
comprehensible and internally coherent instrument that fills the gaps? 
The Declaration contains a Preamble which recalls the ideals and remit of UNESCO, 
identifies the international instruments relied on and highlights the risks represented 
by genetic advances.  Its seven Sections purport to lay down universal bioethical 
standards that will ensure genetic advances are not used in a manner contrary to 
human rights.
86
  Conclusions can be drawn about the Declaration’s significance and 
proper place in the international bioethical and human rights scene based on the extent 
to which the Declaration (1) gives the touchstone values of autonomy, equality and 
solidarity effect in the genetic context through the articulation of understandable and 
internally consistent substantive rights, and (2) answers the questions identified above 
which represent gaps in the pre-existing regime. 
3.2.1 Autonomy 
Although usually relating to individually exercisable choice, the international 
application of autonomy can be complicated by its occasional use with reference to 
the social unit.
87
  This has implications when it comes to autonomy-based rights such 
as confidentiality and freedom from coercion.  The Declaration appears to 
acknowledge this tension, but fails to deal with it, never consistently articulating its 
concept of the value or rationally supporting its patchwork support for autonomy’s 
concomitant rights. 
                                                 
85
  H. Espiell, supra, note 33. 
86
  Section A, “Human Dignity and the Human Genome” (arts. 1-4), is directed at protecting the 
human genome itself.  Section B, “Rights of the Persons Concerned” (arts. 5-9), deals with procedures 
relating to the genome, which are likely to have physical, psychological, economic, social or other 
consequences for the individual or the group to which she or he belongs.  Section C, “Research on the 
Human Genome” (arts. 10-12), addresses limitations on the right of research.  Section D, “Conditions 
for the Exercise of Scientific Activity” (arts. 13-16), enunciates state and individual responsibilities 
regarding research.  Section E, “Solidarity and International Cooperation” (arts. 17-19), espouses 
solidarity and international cooperation with the hope that it will result in all humanity benefiting from 
genetic advances.  Section F, “Promotion of the Principles Set Out in the Declaration” (arts. 20-21), is 
aimed at promotion of the Declaration core principles and the establishment of bioethics as part of the 
culture of the future.  Section G, “Implementation of the Declaration” (arts. 22-25), unique to a non-
binding instrument, suggests that states take all appropriate measures and makes implementation 
recommendations, including the outline of UNESCO activities. 
87
  See A. Taylor, supra, note 8, at 491 and his note 98. 
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Article 4 constitutes an outright autonomy limitation.  It prohibits individuals from 
gaining financially from the genome “in its natural state”. The absence of this 
prohibition from the Preliminary Outline, and the debate over its content and impact 
on existing intellectual property rights, suggest that it was a matter of controversy and 
that the Declaration represents a compromise position: 
[S]hould there be a reference in the preamble to the international 
instruments concerning the protection of intellectual property 
rights?  [S]hould a new article be added … for the prohibition of all 
forms of appropriation or marketing of the results of genome 
research?  Any prohibition … of patenting the results of [genetic] 
research … would have a significant impact on research itself, since 
prohibiting all possibility of gaining commercial benefits would be 
liable to discourage research … . 
It would be difficult to address the … patenting of human genetic 
sequences in the UNESCO context alone, particularly in view of the 
economic interests at stake.  The need for balance between the 
imperative of free access to the results of genome research and the 
investment essential for developing that research must be borne in 
mind. …  
The Chairperson … was of the opinion that UNESCO could not go 
any further in the declaration with regard to the question of 
patentability, in view of the many interests at stake. 
88
 
Given the ability of third parties to gain financially from the human genome through 
the patenting of genes and gene sequences,
89
 the ethical soundness of a prohibition 
limited to individual gene originators is questionable.
90
  Indeed, the IBC subsequently 
issued an Advice
91
 alleging strong ethical grounds for excluding the human genome 
from patentability, and recommending that the WTO clarify that patenting the human 
genome is contrary to the public interest.  The prevalence of cross-national/cultural 
opposition to patenting,
92
 and the potential for industry/economic concerns to drive 
genetic policy (particularly in developing states trying to close the economic gap with 
                                                 
88
  H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 58-59. 
89
  In America, Australia, Europe and Japan.  In South Africa, the courts have endorsed the idea 
that patents create useful incentives for pharmaceutical companies to supply healthcare providers and 
invest in research: see Syntheta (Pty) Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutical NV et al., [1999] 1 S.A. 85 
(C.A.). 
90
  See R. Brownsword, “Dolly, Dignity and the Genetics Debate” (1998) 148 New L.J. 413, and 
D. Beyleveld & R. Brownsword, “Patenting Human Genes: Legality, Morality and Human Rights” in J. 
Harris (ed.), Property Problems: From Genes to Pension Funds (London: Kluwer, 1998) 9-24. 
91
  Advice of the IBC on the Patentability of the Human Genome, UNESCO IBC, 8th Sess., 
Paris, September 12-14, 2001. 
92
  See C. Leng, “Human Genome and Population Genetics Research and the Third World: Some 
Points for Consideration” in Proceedings of the Third Session of the IBC, vol. II (Paris: UNESCO, 
1995) 37-45, at 39-40, who identifies a host of organizations mobilizing against patenting, including 
NGOs, IGOs, religious and indigenous groups. 
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industrialized states),
93
 further suggest that the Declaration’s failure to squarely 
address patenting is a serious lacunae.
94
 
Article 5, although not as philosophically confused as the Declaration’s stance on 
gene ownership and financial gain, nonetheless triggers concerns.  It stipulates, inter 
alia, that all patients/subjects: 
a) Are entitled to full disclosure of the potential risks and benefits of the 
treatment/research; 
b) Must be competent and provide free and informed consent, or authorization 
must be otherwise obtained according to law; and 
c) Have the right to decide whether to be informed of results. 
On its face, the article seems beneficial and obviously addresses concerns about 
autonomy.  However, the utility of its stipulations in practice are unclear, a fact which 
reduces the Declarations comprehensibility and, by implication, its significance. 
For example, stipulation (a) offers little guidance as to the meaning of “full 
disclosure”.
95
  In the genetic context, physicians and counselors ought to 
communicate the (i) objective, type and reliability of tests; (ii) risk of tests; (iii) 
possibility of unexpected results; and (iv) possible psychophysical repercussions.  
Post-testing, physicians and counselors ought to (i) verify that all information has 
been understood; (ii) inquire regarding consequences; and (iii) provide or direct 
patients or subjects to support.
96
  No such criteria are provided. 
Stipulation (b) offers no guidance as to the components of or participants in ethical 
“consent” in the genetic context.  Should it in all circumstances be exercised by the 
subject/patient alone or jointly with others?  Can it be exercised entirely by others?  
Under what conditions?  Inclusion of the requirements that consent be “obtained in 
the manner prescribed by law” and “guided by the person’s best interests” were 
allegedly added to accommodate those jurisdictions where the family or community 
play a role in consent decisions.
97
  Many argue that it is never proper to dispense with 
first-person consent.
98
  Even if it can be, the Declaration fails to recognize that 
                                                 
93
  See S. Pepa et al., “Research and Trade in Genetics: How Countries Should Structure for the 
Future” (1998) 17 Med. Law 437-454. 
94
  For more on gene patenting generally, see M. Kirby, supra, note 4, at 45-46, G. Laurie, 
“Patenting Stem Cells of Human Origin” [2004] 2 E.I.P.R. 59-66, R. Gold, “Biomedical Patents and 
Ethics: A Canadian Solution” (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 413-435, R. Ford, “The Morality of Biotech 
Patents: Differing Legal Obligations in Europe” [1997] E.I.P.R. 315-318, and L. Bently & B. Sherman, 
“The Ethics of Patenting: Towards a Transgenic Patent System” (1995) 3 Med. Law 275-291. 
95
  An issue that is discussed in J. Kegley, “Genetics Decision Making: A Template for Problems 
with Informed Consent” (2002) 21 Med. Law 459-471, and J. Kegley, “An Ethical Imperative: 
Genetics Education for Physicians and Patients” (2003) 22 Med. Law 275-284. 
96
  A. Conti et al., “Informed Consent When Taking Genetic Decisions” (2004) 23 Med. Law 
337-355, at 344. 
97
  H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 76. 
98
  See C. Ijsselmuiden & R. Faden, supra, note 58.  A. Iles, supra, note 46, at 28, points out that, 
ultimately, human rights centre on the individual’s life and experience and seek to alleviate unfairness 
and avoid injury starting with the individual.  R. McCorquodale & R. Fairbrother, supra, note 48, at 
766, quote Eleanor Roosevelt as follows: “Where after all do universal human rights begin?  In the 
small places close to home … .  Yet they are the world of the individual person: the neighbourhood he 
lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory, farms or office where he works.  Such are the 
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consent is not an event but a process the participants of which may develop but which 
must start with the individual,
99
 and it fails to grapple with the implications for the 
patient/subject’s art. 7 privacy rights when first-person consent is dispensed with (i.e., 
who properly receives information, how much information, etc.). 
The permissiveness of stipulation (c) has been described as contrary to solidarity with 
family members,
100
 but is defended as an important autonomy-based right because it 
empowers the affected patient/subject to determine his or her exposure to information 
that may have severe repercussions for their psychological well being.
101
 
Article 5(d) deals with research protocols, but fails to enunciate any clear or precise 
rules, and has been criticized for its vagueness.
102
 
The one unambiguous autonomy-based provision is art. 8, which erects the individual 
right to reparation for damage sustained as a result of genomic interventions.  The 
IBC oscillated between the word “reparation” and “compensation” but settled on the 
former, which offers states greater latitude to fashion such remedies as best suits their 
legal and cultural traditions.
103
  Inclusion of the word “direct” was intended to bar 
actions by descendants.
104
 
Overall, autonomy is not defined, support for autonomy (as defined above) is 
equivocal, and its related rights are left very much to the vagaries of domestic 
lawmakers, a fact which is further emphasized by art. 9, a provision which ultimately 
abdicates the very function of the Declaration, which is to establish universal 
thresholds.  More damaging than its failure to deal clearly or cohesively with 
autonomy as a value (i.e., what is it and is it essential in the genetics and rights 
settings), is its failure to offer sound guidance as to the minimum internationally 
acceptable ethical requirements for (1) observing consent and (2) protecting 
confidentiality where consent is not first-person.  Even if individual self-rule is 
assumed, it fails to address how existing social, economic and political pressures may 
circumscribe or distort the choices individuals make in the genetic context.
105
 
3.2.2 Equality 
A common fear is that genetic information—which is increasingly specific, accurate 
and voluminous—will be used to define and classify people according to race, 
ethnicity, or other markers such as existence of deficiencies or physical/mental 
potentialities, and will generally become a tool by which to perpetuate existing or 
                                                                                                                                            
places where every man, woman or child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without 
discrimination.  Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere.” 
99
  K. Berger, “Informed Consent: Information or Knowledge?” (2003) 22 Med. Law 743-750. 
100
  See J. Harris & K. Keywood, “Ignorance, Information and Autonomy” (2001) 22 T.M.B. 415-
436. 
101
  See R. Andorno, supra, note 41, at 6, where he notes that, in any event, the right is not 
absolute; physicians can override this aspect of confidentiality per art. 9 when treatment is available for 
others who may be affected. 
102
  See A. Taylor, supra, note 8, at 510. 
103
  H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 59. 
104
  H. Espiell, ibid, at 5. 
105
  A. Iles, supra, note 46, at 44. 
(2005) 2:1 SCRIPT-ed 
 
39 
create new social, economic or power divisions and inequalities.
106
  Thus, equality is a 
cornerstone value of the Declaration.
107
 
Article 2 stipulates that everyone is equal in dignity regardless of their genetic make-
up (i.e., even if new technology discloses genetic illness or predisposition).  Together 
with art. 3, which claims that the genome evolves and is influenced by natural and 
social environments, it rejects genetic determinism, which tries to explain all human 
personality and behaviour on the basis of genes.
108
   They “attempt to avoid the 
division of human society into ‘genetically valid’ and ‘genetically non-valid’ 
members, which would constitute a disastrous effect of scientific knowledge [and] … 
would weaken the proper foundation of democracy.”
109
 
Article 6 reflects the anti-discrimination policy common to many international 
instruments,
110
 extending the prohibited grounds to genetic characteristics.  However, 
this right never becomes “concrete” because the article offers no guidance as to what 
practices diminish an individual’s or group’s right to human dignity.  For example, it 
does not address:
111
 
1) The use of genetic markers to delineate groups;112 
2) The significance of unequal access to genetic testing and treatment or the use 
of testing to determine access to treatment (i.e., surgeries, transplants, etc.); or 
3) The use of genetic criteria to determine access to insurance, social benefits, 
employment, promotion, or property. 
Further, it offers no insight as to what international law demands for equal treatment 
in light of one’s genetic circumstances—there are no samples of conduct that is 
unacceptable to underline the scope of the right).  Finally, it makes no suggestions as 
to the appropriate consequences to states, other entities or individuals of infringing 
equality rights.
113
 
                                                 
106
  See A. Caplan, “Handle With Care: Race, Class and Genetics” in T. Murphy & M. Lappe 
(eds.), Justice and the Human Genome Project (Berkeley: U. of al. Press, 1994), and many more. 
107
  See Preamble, paras. 1, 4 and 6. 
108
  Genetic determinists try to explain all human personality/behaviour on the basis of genes.  
They draw teleological sustenance from behavioural geneticists, who try to isolate and identify genes 
relevant to specific behavioural traits and discover modes of intervention.  For more on this, see D. 
Glick & H. Soreg, “Ethics, Public Policy and Behavioural Genetics” (2003) 5 I.M.A.J. 83-86, and 
National Research Council, “Human Rights and Human Genetic Variation Research” in M. Mann et al. 
(eds.), supra, note 56, 380-394. 
109
  R. Andorno, supra, note 41, at 4 
110
  For example, see the UDHR, the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the 
Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (1958), the 
Convention Against Discrimination in Education (1960), the International Convention on the 
Elimination on All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the American Convention on Human Rights 
(1969), the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice (1978), the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979). 
111
  A. Iles, supra, note 46, at 47. 
112
  On this point, N. Papadimitrou & A. Ryan, “Chief Scientist Bob May Lambasts Human 
Genetics Panel (2001) 7 Sci. Soc. 9, report that research continues to seek “intelligence genes”, 
“pleasant traits genes” and “gay genes”. 
113
  Probably because there is no enforcement mechanism and thus no reason to develop sanctions 
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Article 7 ties into art. 6 by addressing equality in relation to genetic information; it 
aims to avoid discrimination by keeping such information confidential.
114
  Specific 
protection was desired because genetic information:
115
 
• Has implications for the current and future health of the patient or subject, 
asymptomatic blood relations, and future (unborn) relatives; 
• Does not change from in utero to post-death, and offers some certainty in 
determining who will be affected by genetic disease; 
• Is unique in the continued existence of massive shortfalls between conditions 
that can be identified and those that can be treated or cured; and 
• Documented instances already exist of genetic discrimination in the insurance 
and employment contexts.
116
   
However, art. 7 fails to address the circumstances when confidentiality may be 
breached or the criteria for doing so.
117
  
Overall, although obviously supportive of equality, the Declaration is vague and 
equivocal and leaves much to domestic lawmakers with respect to defining what 
infringes this right.  It also fails to address control over the activities of private 
corporations.
118
 
3.2.3 Solidarity 
The Declaration addresses solidarity both philosophically and practically.  
Philosophically, art. 1 affirms the “fundamental unity” of the human species and the 
value of preserving it.  Art. 1 also stresses our inter-relatedness, common genetic 
blueprint and shared future by stating that the human genome is, symbolically, “the 
heritage of humanity”.
119
  This notion is intended to convey the idea that the human 
genome engages a responsibility from and for all of humanity and:
120
 
                                                                                                                                            
or remedies, although a provision akin to art. 8 might have been added to punctuate the right. 
114
  The Declaration does not specify what constitutes a violation of the right to genetic privacy, 
but UNESCO has since adopted the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003). 
115
  H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 4, R. Andorno, supra, note 41, at 6, I. Ellis et al., “Retained 
Human Tissue: A Molecular Genetic Goldmine or Modern Grave Robbing? A Legal Approach to 
Obtaining and Using Stored Human Samples” (2003) 22 Med. Law 357-372, G. Laurie, Genetic 
Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 2002), at 92-105, K. 
Mason et al., Law and Medical Ethics, 6
th
 ed. (London: Butterworths, 2002), at 207-212, T. Murray, 
“Genetic Exceptionalism and ‘Future Diaries’: Is Genetic Information Different from Other Medical 
Information?” in M. Rothstein (ed.), Genetic Secrets (London: Yale U. Press, 1997), 60-76.  See also 
House of Lords Select Committee of Science & Technology, “Fourth Report: Human Genetic 
Databases” (2000) at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/Id200001/Idselect/Idsctech/57/5701.htm 
(Mar. 4/04). 
116
  N. Holtzman & D. Shapiro, “The New Genetics: Genetic Testing and Public Policy” (1998) 
316 B.M.J. 852-856, at 854.  See also T. Lemmons, “Selective Justice, Genetic Discrimination and 
Insurance: Should We Single Out Genes in Our Laws?” (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 347-412. 
117
  A. Black, “Confidentiality and Drivers License Authorities” (2003) 22 Med. Law 333-343. 
118
  A. Iles, supra, note 46, at 49.  The issue of cross-border transfers of medical information and 
the desperate need for universal regulation of same is addressed in H. Abbing, “Medical 
Confidentiality and Electronic Patient Files” (2000) 19 Med. Law 107-112. 
119
  A phrase modified from the “common heritage of humanity”, which was coined by A. Pardo 
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1) Is not suitable for appropriation by any state or private entity; 
2) Requires a management system in which all users have rights and benefits are 
shared; and  
3) Is reserved for peaceful purposes and preserved for future generations. 
Unfortunately, this premise is weakened by the Declaration’s failure to address or 
condemn gene patenting, which represents the greatest risk of “appropriation” and 
which is currently “managed” through a “system” widely criticized as inappropriate to 
medicine, genetics, and the protection of human rights (the latter of which is not even 
a patentability factor). 
On the practical level, although accepting that the right to pursue research, necessary 
for the progress of knowledge and freedom of thought, is a human right,
121
 the 
Declaration’s conception of solidarity is linked with state/group and individual duties 
rather than rights.  With respect to states, the Declaration directs that they: 
• Foster conditions favourable for ethical research, (2) ensure that research is 
not used for non-peaceful purposes, and (3) recognize the value of establishing 
multidisciplinary ethics committees independent from political, economic, 
scientific and medical authorities;
122
 
• Ensure solidarity towards genetically vulnerable individuals, families and 
populations by fostering research on the identification, prevention and 
treatment of genetically-based and influenced diseases, both rare and 
endemic;
123
 
• Practice international solidarity toward developing states by disseminating 
scientific knowledge so that advances can be enjoyed by everyone, and the 
rich/poor and developed/developing gap does not widen;
124
 
• Encourage measures that will enable developing states to benefit from 
scientific and technological research.
125
 
                                                                                                                                            
(Malta) and used in various instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the 
UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation (1966), the Declaration of 
Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor (1970), and the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(1982).  Although used in the Preliminary Outline, it was dropped in favour of the modified form 
because of fears that it might be interpreted in commercial terms or used to dilute individual rights in 
favour of eugenic policies: see H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 3, and R. Ida, “Human Genome as 
Common Heritage of Humankind” in N. Fujiki & D. Macer (eds.), Bioethics in Asia (Tsukuba: Eubios 
Ethics Institute, 1998) 59-63. 
120
  R. Andorno, supra, note 41, at 3. 
121
  See art. 12, as well as the ICESCR, the UNESCO Recommendation on the Status of Scientific 
Researchers (1974), and Y. Dinstein, “Technological Development, Equality and Non-Discrimination” 
in L. Sicilianos & M. Gavouneli (eds.), supra, note 2, 215-222, at 216.  See also Huvig v. France 
(1990), 12 E.H.R.R. 528 (E.C.H.R.), and Niemietz v. Germany (1992), 16 E.H.R.R. 97 (E.C.H.R.), in 
the European context. 
122
  See arts. 14, 15 and 16. 
123
  See art. 17.  D. Resnik, “The Distribution of Biomedical Research Resources and International 
Justice” (2004) 4 D.W.B. 42-57, reports that less than 10% of research funds are directed at addressing 
the problems responsible for 90% of the world’s burden of disease. 
124
  See art. 18.  See also the discussion in R. Andorno, supra, note 41, at 9. 
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However, it offers no guidance or concrete recommendations as to how solidarity 
between nations might be manifested (i.e., no models of global assistance to ensure 
access to genetic advances are identified).
126
 
With respect to individuals, art. 10 stipulates that human rights must take precedence 
over research.  Article 12 stipulates that the benefits of research and advances should 
be made available to all, and that research shall be directed to the improvement of 
health and relief from suffering.  Article 13 identifies the ethical duties incumbent on 
every researcher (i.e., meticulousness, caution, intellectual honesty, and integrity).  
The Declaration also contains research prohibitions identified as contrary to human 
dignity; namely (1) human reproductive cloning (art. 11),
127
 and (2) germ-line 
interventions (art. 24).
128
 
These prohibitions belie claims that (1) the IBC is merely a forum for exchanging 
ideas and facilitating understanding that does not pass judgment on specific 
practices,
129
 and (2) the Declaration enunciates principles, not regulates scientific or 
medical practice.
130
 Although they are defended, in part, on the basis that domestic 
and international prohibitions already exist,
131
 there is no indication how the processes 
are contrary to human dignity.
132
  Indeed, the ethical basis of these blanket 
claims/bans is questionable, particularly when used to restrict practices which may 
pass ethical muster on a case-by-case basis as technology progresses and 
understanding increases.
133
  Their inclusion has led to allegations that the Declaration 
ignores the fact that entirely beneficial consequences should be a factor in 
determining the propriety of practices.
134
  In addition, they create certain internal 
inconsistencies: 
It is difficult to reconcile these different viewpoints, one saying that 
human dignity “makes it imperative not to reduce individuals to 
their genetic characteristics” and the other that “deliberate 
                                                                                                                                            
125
  See art. 19. 
126
  As noted by A. Taylor, supra, note 8, at 510. 
127
  Very generally, human reproductive cloning is a means of producing a human chromosomally 
and genetically identical to another.  For more on the process, see M. Lupton, supra, note 13, and M. 
Revel, supra, note 58. 
128
  Very generally, germline gene therapy is a means of producing a human using reproductive 
cells that have undergone a permanent genetic modification.  For more on the process, see M. Revel, 
ibid. 
129
  See F. Mayor, supra, note 54, at 66, and www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=Social 
Sciences/Ethics/Bioethics (May 21/04). 
130
  H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 58, citing the comments at the 5th Meeting of the Legal 
Commission. 
131
  R. Andorno, supra, note 41, at 7-9. 
132
  Failure to ethically substantiate these claims is common among the cloning bans: see M. 
Lupton, supra, note 13, at 110-114. 
133
  See the sound and incisive critique of the reproductive cloning ban by J. Harris, supra, note 
61.  Both D. Beyleveld & R. Brownsword, supra, note 66, at 155, and L. Ulrich, “Reproductive Rights 
and Genetic Disease” in J. Humber & R. Almeder (eds.), supra, note 2, 351-360, at 359, identify some 
ethical arguments supportive of cloning or “infant design” rights. 
134
  R. Brownsword, supra, note 68, at 4-5. 
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creation of genetically identical human beings is contrary to human 
dignity.”
135
 
A more balanced approach providing reasonable criteria for consideration of practices 
currently viewed as questionable was inexplicably eschewed. 
Overall, although the Declaration espouses solidarity (via researcher responsibilities 
and state sharing of biotechnological advances so everyone can benefit from emerging 
medical techniques), its position is not entirely coherent.  With reference to the 
definition above, although the Declaration certainly seeks to avoid harm through 
certain of its provisions, it may be over-inclusive by banning practices which may 
help patients and ultimately promote beneficence and justice by expanding treatment 
options. 
3.3 Summation 
The above demonstrates that the Declaration addresses the values of autonomy, 
equality, and solidarity and their concomitant rights (consent, confidentiality, non-
discrimination) and duties (information sharing, avoiding “dangerous” practices) in 
the genetic context in a broad manner only.  It is claimed that the Declaration is: 
1) An attempt to “get things moving on the international level [and] to stimulate 
further international and regional activity;”
136
 
2) “[A] call to attention” to states to make them aware of the ethical issues that 
genomic research presents;
137
 
3) “[N]ot … a final expression of international consensus and policy on advances 
in genetic science [but] a first step toward stimulating international debate and 
cooperation,”
138
 and 
4) “[J]ust the first step towards the elaboration of an international biomedical 
law.”
139
 
Viewed as such, and appreciating the need to accommodate diverse social, cultural, 
political, and socioeconomic backgrounds and the futility of seeking dramatic change, 
the Declaration is useful; an understandably cautious approach that distilled a few 
basic rules from harmonized principles.
140
  So characterized, it has been described as 
“the most thorough global initiative to date addressing the need to protect human 
rights with respect to genetic advances.”
141
  Further, the inclusion of implementation 
                                                 
135
  M. Revel, supra, note 58, at 710, who highlights the irreconcilability of arts. 2, 3 and 11. 
136
  M. Kirby, supra, note 32, Q-1 and Q-3. 
137
  R. Andorno, supra, note 41, at 10, cites an E. Benda (Germany), interview in the Frankfurter 
Rundschau, given on November 1, 1997. 
138
  A. Taylor, supra, note 8, at 511. 
139
  R. Andorno, supra, note 20, at 959. 
140
  R. Andorno, ibid, at 962. 
141
  A. Taylor, supra, note 8, at 509. 
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mechanisms could, in the long run, improve the continued life and relevance of the 
Declaration.
142
 
Insofar as the above is true, the criticisms leveled against it may be overly 
specific/rigorous and unfair.  However, this is an instrument that claims to offer 
guiding principles.  As such, it should be expected to guide, but it fails to do so in 
many important respects (i.e., the core values were not addressed in a comprehensive, 
coherent or internally consistent manner, no new rights were articulated to match the 
new scientific reality, paradigmatic and systemic issues were ignored).
143
  In addition: 
[T]he Declaration … overlooks a wide variety of issues … .  For 
example, the Declaration does not discuss human embryo research, 
genetic techniques to choose the sex of children or the permissible 
uses of therapeutic abortion for genetic disorders, including the 
nature and extent of reproductive autonomy and the limitations on 
government interventions in reproductive decision-making.
144
 
Its failures may stem from its origins as a reaction to genetic advances (specifically 
cloning), its self-imposed time pressure,
145
 or the political limitations under which the 
IBC worked.
146
  Regardless, its “cursory treatment of the most intricate problems”
147
 
means that it only minimally advances the understanding of the interaction between 
genetics and the values and rights addressed. 
Further, and more importantly, it suffers from the same weaknesses identified with 
respect to the pre-existing regime in that it fails to answer the questions important in 
the medical context that it left unanswered.  Although identifying “inappropriate” 
research, it fails to defend its position (Q-1).  It addresses consent, but not really in a 
manner wholly relevant to situations with genetic implications (Q-2).  Although 
reiterating that benefits must be shared, it elaborates no mechanisms for even 
distribution (Q-3).  It takes no stand on the patentability of human genetic material 
(Q-4).  It certainly makes clear its position on determinism and discrimination, but 
offers no positive response when they raise their ugly head (Q-5).  It identifies no 
disclosure mechanisms for genetic information (Q-6).  By its frequent deference to 
domestic lawmakers, it fails to provide a universal response that will guard against 
                                                 
142
  M. Gavouneli, “Binding Character and Implementation Control of International Instruments 
on Biomedicine” in L. Sicilianos & M. Gavouneli (eds.), supra, note 2, 197-211, at 202-204.  However, 
M. Wadman & D. Butler, “UNESCO Declaration Lacks Legal Teeth” (1998) 391 Nature 219, note that 
international supervision of state responses to non-binding Declarations is minimal.  Further, UNESCO 
has had difficulty establishing itself as a centre for implementation: see A. Taylor, supra, note 8, at 
528, and the sources cited in his note 405. 
143
  For example, the public-private divide (all the more important in the new global reality) and 
the resultant gaps in protection were ignored.  For more on this, see H. Undersmith & C. Chinkin, “The 
Gender of Jus Cogens” (1993) 15 H.R. Quart. 63-73. 
144
  A. Taylor, supra, note 8, at 510-511. 
145
  Given the rapidity with which scientific advances were proceeding, the IBC was encouraged 
to conclude its work with all due haste and, in any event, by 1998, the jubilee of the UDHR: see H. 
Espiell, supra, note 33, at 43-44. 
146
  R. Andorno, supra, note 41, at 2, notes that “the drafters … were clearly aware of the fact that 
if they had decided to prepare a binding instrument, [it] would never have been approved.” 
147
  See A. Iles, supra, note 46, at 43.  M. Gavouneli, supra, note 142, 197-211, also notes that the 
Declaration contains only vague normative content. 
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piecemeal legislation and a “race to the bottom”.  As such, it comes under just 
criticism. 
All told, the Declaration is not a failure, but an equivocal success; perhaps a better 
example of “knee-jerk reaction” than “lengthened foresight”.  One could reasonably 
describe it as an exercise in pragmatic ethics that embodies a reiteration of existing 
general human rights principles in the genetic context.  It underlines the importance 
of autonomy, equality and solidarity to genetics and emphasizes the need to ensure 
that advances reflect human rights standards, but it does little to articulate how this 
might be done “on the ground”.  Ultimately, massive gaps remain, permitting 
dramatically varying practices.  Although the issues are more clearly articulated in the 
genetic context by the Declaration, it fails to respond fully to those issues, and so the 
need that existed continues. 
4. Conclusion 
The stunning genetic achievements of the late 20th and early 21st centuries 
necessitate “lengthened foresight”, not only because of the consequences they can 
have for future generations, but because the forms of oppression permitted by them 
are non-traditional (i.e., relating more to the often-invisible distribution of life 
opportunities).
148
 
Globalization combined with the nature of genetics itself demands a cooperative and 
universalist regulatory approach.  The pre-existing regime was neither cohesive nor 
specific enough to address the concerns raised by the new genetics.  Thus, UNESCO 
and its IBC tried to improve matters and exercise this “lengthened foresight” through 
the Declaration. 
The drafting process, which identified short- and long-term genetic issues, was 
perhaps UNESCO’s greatest success.  The debate, the formation of an epistemic 
community,
149
 and the simple existence of a genetics-specific instrument fostered 
further debate and prompted manifold bioethical activities that are ongoing.
150
  These 
are unequivocal pluses. 
                                                 
148
  A. Iles, ibid, at 57. 
149
  Which was considered necessary to the coordination and augmentation of biomedical treaties: 
see S. Murphy, supra, note 14, at 49. 
150
  It was intended to “get things moving” and to “stimulate further regional and international 
activity”, and it has informed the work of many national bioethics committees: M. Kirby, supra, note 
32, Q-14.  Many genetics-related conferences, meetings, symposia and workshops have discussed the 
Declaration and it has informed the thinking of stakeholders in the genetic field: Secretariat, Report 
and Evaluation of the Implementation of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights, UNESCO, 32nd Sess. of the Gen. Conf., UNESCO Doc. 32 C/23 (2003).  In the UK, a non-
UNESCO member, it was drawn on by the Human Genetics Advisory Commission and the Human 
Fertility and Embryology Authority, Cloning Issues in Reproduction, Science and Medicine (UK: 
HGAC/HFEA, 1998), and by the Human Genetics Commission, Inside Information: Balancing 
Interests in the Use of Personal Genetic Data (UK: HGC, 2002): see R. Brownsword, supra, note 90, 
and M. Bale, “Inquiry re: Declaration” at mark.bale@doh.gsi.gov.uk (May 14/04).  See also G. 
Berlinguer & L. De Castro, Report of the IBC on the Possibility of Elaborating a Universal Instrument 
on Bioethics, UNESCO, 32d Sess. of the Gen. Conf., UNESCO Doc. SHS/EST/02/CIB-9/5, as well as 
www.unesco.org and www.who.int for further international activities, which include further UNESCO-
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For many reasons including vagueness and internal inconsistencies, the significance 
of the Declaration itself is more equivocal.  Reliant on a great variety of cultural and 
political divisions, it manifests as an instrument of “limited ambition” (i.e., it fails to 
elucidate a readily comprehensible goal capable of pressuring responses and clearly 
guiding policy-making).
151
  It thus fails to adequately provide the reasoned 
“lengthened foresight” that was considered so vital.  Nonetheless, the Declaration, 
with its quiet and intermittent influence, must be considered a limited success.
152
 
Despite being an additional non-binding instrument in a field littered with 
unenforceable instruments, the Declaration is not irrelevant.
153
  Indeed, time and state 
practice may eventually transform the Declaration from soft law into something more 
binding.
154
 
A jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction analysis would be necessary to determine whether the 
Declaration’s primary values and concomitant rights have been recognized and given 
legal effect at the domestic level “out in the world”, and such is not within the scope 
of this article.  From the practical advancement of these values and rights in the post-
Declaration, one might draw some conclusions as to the “universality” of the 
Declaration.  Similarly, the “universalizing dynamic” engendered by the Declaration 
is another question of interest which may warrant further consideration. 
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  For more on the transformation of soft law into binding law, see M. Olivier, “The Relevance 
of ‘Soft Law’ as a Source of International Human Rights” (2002) 35 C.I.L.J.S.A. 289-307, at 294-301, 
who states that soft law is useful in the transitional stage of development when the content of 
international norms are vague and imprecise. 
